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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Edward Ray Christensen appeals from the judgment entered upon his
conditional plea of guilty to possession of a controlled substance. Specifically,
Christensen appeals the district court's denial of his motion to suppress
statements he made to his parole officer and law enforcement during a parole
compliance search of his residence.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
Parole Officer Guiberson received information that Christensen, a parolee
on her supervision caseload, had been involved in illegal activities, specifically,
selling methamphetamine. (Tr., p.14, Ls.5-8.) Officer Guiberson contacted the
Idaho State Police to request assistance (Tr., p.16, Ls.3-11) and went to
Christensen's house to conduct a home visit (Tr., p.14, Ls.2-4).
Officer Guiberson entered Christensen's house, followed by two ISP
officers, and began talking to Christensen while the troopers readied to start a
"probation search" in the living room.

(Tr., p.49, Ls.6-9.)

Officer Guiberson

advised Christensen she was there because of concerns he was violating the
terms of his parole by selling methamphetamine, including relaying the
information that a woman who had just left his house told the officers that
Christensen had sold her methamphetamine. (Tr., p.22, Ls.20-25.) Christensen
told Officer Guiberson that "he had sold it to her."

(Tr., p.22, L.25.)

Officer

Guiberson let Christensen know they were going to search his house and asked
if there was anything illegal.

(Tr., p.24, Ls.22-24.)
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Christensen admitted to

Officer Guiberson there was "methamphetamine under the couch." (Tr., p.24,
Ls.24-25.)

"[T]he couch was lifted, and methamphetamine was found."

(Tr.,

p.25, Ls.1-2.)
Trooper

Skinner

joined

Officer

Guiberson

and

Christensen

Christensen's kitchen to talk to him about the methamphetamine.

in

(Tr., p.49,

Ls.10-13.) Christensen was never handcuffed and sat on a stool in his kitchen
about his suppliers, his level of sales, and his personal methamphetamine use.
(Tr., p.25, Ls.3-5.) The home compliance search took less than an hour. (Tr.,
p.29, L.17.)
That state charged

Christensen with

possession

of a controlled

substance, methamphetamine, and with being a persistent violator of the law.
(R., pp.39-42.)

Christensen filed a motion to suppress asserting his "Fifth

Amendment Right against self incrimination was violated in that [he] was not
advised of his Miranda Rights prior to any questioning when he was in custody
and not free to leave." (R., p.64.) The district court denied Christensen's motion
to suppress, finding "a reasonable person in Christensen's circumstance would
not have felt his freedom of action was curtailed to the degree associated with a
formal arrest." (R., p.92.)
Christensen entered a conditional plea of guilty to possession of a
controlled substance, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to
suppress.

(R., pp.166, 170-171; Tr., p.71, L.17 - p.72, L.17.)

The state

withdrew the persistent violator enhancement and agreed to recommend a
sentence of four years fixed followed by one year indeterminate. (R., pp.166,
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170-171; Tr., p.71, Ls.20-22.) The district court sentenced Christensen to a fiveyear unified term with the first four years fixed. (R., p.177; Tr., p.88, Ls.17-18.)
Christensen timely appealed. (R., pp.184-187.)
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ISSUE
Christensen states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it held that Mr. Christensen was not
entitled to a Miranda warning and denied his motion to suppress?

The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Christensen failed to show error in the district court's determination
that his statements were not obtained in violation of his Miranda rights?
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ARGUMENT
Christensen Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Christensen argues that the district court erred by denying his request to

suppress "statements made in response to questioning by law enforcement
officers and evidence discovered in the home because he was not given Miranda
warnings prior to being questioned while he was in custody." (Appellant's brief,
p.7.) Because the evidence shows Christensen was not in custody at the time
he was questioned, his argument fails.

B.

Standard Of Review
The determination of whether police are required to provide Miranda

warnings presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Silva, 134 Idaho
848, 854, 11 P.3d 44, 50 (Ct. App. 2000). The appellate court reviews the trial
court's findings of fact for clear error, but gives free review to the application of
constitutional principles to those facts.

C.

&

Christensen Has Failed To Demonstrate That He Was In Custody
Equivalent To Formal Arrest At The Time He Made The Statements He
Seeks To Suppress
Before

an

individual

is

subjected

to

custodial

interrogation,

the

interrogating officers must advise the individual of certain rights, including the
right to remain silent.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966).

However, "police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to
everyone whom they question." Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492,495 (1977).

5

Miranda requires warnings only when the individual being questioned is in
custody. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468.
The United States Supreme Court has made clear that "custody" for
purposes of Miranda turns on whether there is a formal arrest or restraint on
freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. California
v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983); see also State v. James, 148 Idaho 574,
576-77, 225 P.3d 1169, 1171-72 (2010). A mere investigative detention does
not trigger the requirement of Miranda warnings. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S.
420, 440 (1984); State v. Ybarra, 102 Idaho 573, 576-77, 634 P.2d 435, 438-39
(1981 ). The test for determining whether an individual is in custody for purposes
of Miranda is whether, considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding
the interrogation, there was a "formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement
of the degree associated with a formal arrest." Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125; see
also Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994). When applying this test
the "only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position
would have understood his situation." Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442; State v. Doe,
137 Idaho 519, 523, 50 P.3d 1014, 1018 (2002); State v. Albaugh, 133 Idaho
587, 591, 990 P.2d 753, 757 (Ct. App. 1999). Factors that may be considered
include the time and location of the interrogation, the conduct of the officers, the
nature and manner of the questioning, and the presence of other persons.
Albaugh, 133 Idaho at 591, 990 P.2d at 757; State v. Medrano, 123 Idaho 114,
117, 844 P.2d 1364, 1367 (Ct. App. 1992).

"The burden of showing custody

rests on the defendant seeking to exclude evidence based on a failure to
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administer Miranda warnings." State v. Silver, 155 Idaho 29, 32, 304 P.3d 304,
307 (Ct. App. 2013).
Because the "in custody" test for Miranda requires a restraint on freedom
associated with formal arrest, a person subject to a routine traffic stop or an
investigative detention based upon reasonable suspicion of criminal activity,
although not "free to leave," is ordinarily not in custody for purposes of Miranda.
Berkemer, 468 U.S. 420; State v. Ybarra, 102 Idaho 573, 634 P.2d 435 (1981).
In Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98 (2005), the Supreme Court reiterated its
holding in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981 ), "that officers
executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority 'to detain the
occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted."'

Such a

detention during the execution of a search warrant represents only an
incremental intrusion on personal liberty when the search of a home has been
authorized by a valid warrant. 1 Summers, 452 U.S. at 703. Such detentions are

1

Law enforcement officers may also detain occupants of premises during a
parole compliance search without placing the occupants "in custody" for
purposes of Miranda. Sanchez v. Canales, 574 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9 th Cir. 2009)
("We hold, pursuant to Muehler v. Mena ... that officers may constitutionally
detain the occupants of a home during a parole or probation compliance
search.") (overruled in part by United States v. King, 687 F.3d 1189 (9 th Cir.
2012) (overruling Sanchez and other cases "to the extent they hold that 'there is
no constitutional difference between probation and parole for purposes of the
fourth amendment. ... These cases conflict with the Supreme Court's holding
that 'parolees have fewer expectations of privacy than probationers.' Samson v.
California, 547 U.S. 843, 850 ... (2006).")
Inasmuch as the overruling of Sanchez by King does not affect Sanchez's
holding that officers may constitutionally detain occupants of a home during a
parole search - vis-a-vis a probation search - the rule set forth in Sanchez
applies to Christensen because his home was subjected to a parole compliance
search.

7

"surely less intrusive than the search itself' and "substantially less intrusive than
an arrest."

1sL at 701-702.

Absent extenuating circumstances such as the use of

handcuffs or force, "a person detained during the execution of a search warrant
is generally not in custody" for purposes of Miranda." State v. Young, 136 Idaho
711, 719, 39 P.3d 651, 659 (Ct. App. 2002).

This is so despite the fact that

officers, incident to the detention, necessarily control the person's movements to
a certain degree.

1sL at 720-721,

39 P.3d at 660-661.

"[W]hether a person's detention during the execution of a search warrant
rises to a degree associated with formal arrest must be determined on a caseby-case basis."

1sL

at 719, 39 P.3d at 659.

Factors to be considered by the

court include the time and location of the interrogation, the conduct of the
officers, the nature and manner of the questioning, and the presence of other
persons. State v. Medrano, 123 Idaho 114, 117-118, 844 P.2d 1364, 1367-1368
(Ct. App. 1992).

It is the defendant's burden to demonstrate that she was in

custody. State v. James, 148 Idaho 574, 577, 225 P.3d 1169, 1172 (2010) ("We
join the vast majority of courts that have considered the issue and hold that the
burden of showing custody rests on the defendant seeking to exclude evidence
based on a failure to administer Miranda warnings.").
Under these standards even imprisonment, standing alone, may not be
enough to trigger the requirement of Miranda warnings. The custody inquiry
under Miranda "depends upon whether [custody] exerts the coercive pressure
that Miranda was designed to guard against - the danger of coercion that results
from the interaction of custody and official interrogation." Maryland v. Shatzer,
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559 U.S. 98, 113 (2010) (emphasis original, brackets and internal quotations
omitted).

Custody to the degree associated with formal arrest alone is not

enough to create the necessity of Miranda warnings, but is merely a "necessary
and not sufficient condition" to finding a requirement of Miranda warnings.

kl

Thus, the Supreme Court of the United States has concluded that "lawful
imprisonment imposed upon conviction of a crime does not create the coercive
pressures identified in Miranda."

kl

(holding that inmate who invoked right to

silence could be re-interrogated after passage of time and Miranda waiver
despite lack of break in custody).
The facts of this case fully support the conclusion that Christensen was
not in custody at the time he made incriminating statements. The testimony at
the suppression hearing established the discussions with Christensen took place
in a relaxed atmosphere in the kitchen of his own home where Christensen freely
discussed his methamphetamine sales and personal usage. (Tr., p.24, L.22 p.25, L.9, p.28, Ls.19-21, p.33, Ls.2-5, p.34, L.10.)

Christensen was never

placed in handcuffs. (Tr., p.25, L.6, p.33, L.2, p.34, L.9.) Although there were
other officers on scene (Tr., p.27, Ls.1-4), the testimony established there were
only three officers inside Christensen's house for the parole compliance search
and only two of them interviewed Christensen (Tr.,p.49, Ls.6-9). The entire
encounter took between 45 minutes and an hour. (Tr., p.29, Ls.15-18.)
Christensen argues the state cannot claim there was no evidence of an
overbearing interrogation because "five officers arrived at [his] home at the same
time, and at least three of them entered his home right away." (Appellant's brief,
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p.9 (footnote excluded).) This statement, however, is not an accurate description
of Christensen's circumstances at the time he made the challenged statements. 2
Although there appear to have been five officers present at the scene,
Christensen was questioned only by his parole officer and one ISP trooper and
there is no evidence whatsoever that the other officers were even close, much
less that they surrounded him or caused a coercive environment. In addition, as
noted above, the evidence clearly established Christensen was not handcuffed
at any point during the encounter. Because Christensen fails to even address
his custody level at the relevant time, he has failed to show error in the district
court's determination that Christensen was not in custody for purposes of
Miranda.
Christensen asserts he was in custody for purposes of Miranda because
"his status as a parolee changed the entire equation" and the court failed to
consider this. (Appellant's brief, p.10.)

Christensen appears to argue that by

virtue of being on parole, he was imprisoned and therefore necessarily entitled to
Miranda warnings.

(Appellant's brief, pp.10-12.)

As discussed above,

imprisonment alone is not sufficient to trigger Miranda warnings.

Christensen

fails to take into consideration the totality of the circumstances surrounding his
statements made to his parole officer during a parole compliance search of his

Although Christensen's brief does not indicate the specific statements he finds
violative of his rights, a review of the transcript of the suppression hearing points
to statements made to Officer Guiberson and Trooper Skinner when the three of
them were alone in the kitchen.
2
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home. It is clear from the evidence that Christensen was comfortable and felt
unthreatened while having a discussion in his own kitchen with his parole officer
and a state trooper about Christensen's involvement in methamphetamine use
and sales in an obvious attempt to avoid a harsher charge than the possession
of a controlled substance he ultimately received. (See generally, Tr., p.13-42.)
Contrary to Christensen's assertion on appeal, application of the law to
the facts established at the suppression motion hearing shows that, although he
was detained, he was not in custody for purposes of Miranda when he was
interrogated. As the district court correctly found, "during Christensen's in-home
interview, his freedom of action was not limited to the degree associated with
formal arrest."

(R., p.94.)

Consequently, the officers were not required to

administer Miranda warnings before questioning him.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's
decision affirming the judgment of conviction.

th

DATED this 19 day of Mar
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
th

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 19 day of March 2015, served a
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
copy addressed to:
REED P. ANDERSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the
Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office.
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